Anonymous and Revocable V2V Authentication and Key Agreement Scheme for VANETs

Abstract

Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V) communication in Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks (VANETs) is vulnerable to impersonation, privacy leakage, and other security threats over open wireless channels. Existing authentication schemes commonly rely on a centralized trusted authority (TA), resulting in increased latency and limited scalability. To address these issues, this paper proposes ARV2AKA, an anonymous and revocable V2V authentication and key agreement scheme for resource-constrained vehicular networks. ARV2AKA employs elliptic curve cryptography and pseudonymous certificates to achieve efficient mutual authentication and session key establishment without real-time TA involvement. Unlike simply combining existing cryptographic primitives, the proposed scheme adopts a system-level design that tightly integrates implicit certificates, traceability tags, and revocation mechanisms to provide conditional privacy and efficient identity accountability. Security analysis under the Real-or-Random (RoR) model and formal verification using ProVerif demonstrate resistance to major authentication attacks while ensuring forward secrecy. Performance evaluation on Raspberry Pi 5, used as an embedded cryptographic benchmarking platform, shows that ARV2AKA achieves low computational overhead (8.03 ms), communication cost (1888 bits), and energy consumption (63.9 mJ), demonstrating its suitability for secure and scalable V2V communications in dense VANET environments.