Policy capacity, collaborative governance, and the institutional design of implementation arrangements: food security PPPs in Kenya

Abstract

This article empirically investigates how different institutional designs of implementation arrangements are associated with specific configurations of policy capacity and, in turn, with variation in implementation outputs. Building on the policy capacity framework developed by Wu et al. (2015) and its extension to collaborative settings, the article analyses three irrigation public–private partnership (PPP) projects in Kenya—Galana Kulalu, Perkerra, and Chakama—through a small-N, case-oriented comparative design. The study suggests that variation in implementation outputs is best understood through the interaction between institutional design and the configuration of analytical, managerial, and political capacities activated across individual, organizational, and systemic levels. The findings indicate that political capacity serves as an important enabling condition for more effective collaborative arrangements, while the relative weight of analytical and managerial capacities varies with the coordination logic embedded in each arrangement. More hierarchical and rule-based arrangements are associated with stronger implementation outputs where analytical and managerial capacities are institutionalized, whereas more networked and adaptive arrangements rely more heavily on managerial-political capacities rooted in trust, partner mobilization, and negotiated coordination. By connecting policy capacity research with implementation research on collaborative arrangements, the article contributes to a more relational, institutionally grounded understanding of why similar policy interventions yield different implementation outputs under broadly comparable conditions.