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EXE-Bench: Ranking the Tradeoffs of AI-based Windows Malware Detectors for Real-World Usability

Jul 2026 · arXiv.org · Vol abs/2607.24177 · 0 citations · 50 references
Computer Science

TL;DR

ExE-Bench assesses performance, temporal and adversarial robustness, and computational overhead, aggregating them into a single score for direct and fair model comparison, and highlights how evaluations conducted only after deployment are suboptimal and unable to provide a complete picture of their performance.

Abstract

Due to the lack of systematic evaluations, we are not yet able to determine which AI-based Windows malware detector to deploy in production, since existing evaluations (i) differ in terms of data used for both training and testing; (ii) do not consider temporal analysis to showcase whether models withstand the passage of time; (iii) avoid security evaluations with adversarial attacks that could highlight their brittleness against content-injection attacks; and (iv) neglect the computational requirements for deployment, risking slow inference on endpoints. For these reasons, we develop EXE-Bench, a comprehensive benchmark of AI-based Windows malware detectors. EXE-Bench assesses performance, temporal and adversarial robustness, and computational overhead, aggregating them into a single score for direct and fair model comparison. Through EXE-Bench, we highlight how evaluations conducted only after deployment are suboptimal and unable to provide a complete picture of their performance. In particular, through our analysis, we remark how much domain knowledge instilled through feature engineering is still extremely useful in this domain, resisting both time and adversarial attacks, in stark contrast with most of the deep networks that only excel right after deployment.

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