Navigating the Friction Between Sovereign Protectionism and Multilateralism: A Legal Analysis of Recent U.S. Tariff Adjustments under International Trade Law

Abstract

In the contemporary era of global commerce, the traditional leanings toward neoliberal liberalization are increasingly being challenged by a paradigm of "economic securitization." This article examines the legal complexities of recent United States (U.S.) tariff adjustments, specifically those enacted under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 and Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974. Utilizing a qualitative literature review methodology, this study investigates how these domestic measures interact with, and often circumvent, the World Trade Organization (WTO) legal framework. The findings suggest that the U.S. strategy of utilizing "national security" exceptions (GATT Article XXI) has initiated a systemic crisis in the rules-based multilateral system, leading to a fragmented landscape of "friend-shoring" and bilateral reciprocity. This analysis highlights the impact on global value chains and the legal responses from trading partners. The article concludes that while domestic sovereignty remains paramount, the lack of a functional dispute settlement mechanism threatens the predictability of international trade law.