Information Sharing and Green Innovation in a Low-Carbon Platform Supply Chain Under Cap-and-Trade

Abstract

This study develops a game-theoretic model of a platform-led supply chain in which a manufacturer invests in green innovation under a cap-and-trade regulation. We examine how three information-sharing strategies—no sharing (NI), free sharing (FI), and paid sharing (TI)—affect the manufacturer’s green innovation level, both firms’ profits, and total supply chain carbon emissions. Our analysis reveals that the effect of information sharing is state-dependent: when the realized market potential exceeds its prior expectation, sharing stimulates green innovation, raises platform profit, and reduces emissions; when demand falls below expectations, the opposite holds. For the platform, paid sharing delivers the highest expected profit by extracting the full value of demand information. Furthermore, the emission-reducing effect of information sharing outweighs the demand expansion effect under favorable demand conditions, leading to a net decrease in total carbon emissions. These results underscore the governance role of demand information in aligning economic and environmental goals in platform supply chains, and they offer actionable guidance for managers and policymakers.