As large language models are increasingly deployed in real-world systems, safety failures can still lead to harmful outputs and dangerous misuse. We argue that the essence of safety is adversarial: many failures arise not from natural inputs alone, but from strategic attempts to evade model policies and safeguards. However, existing general-purpose model development largely overlook this adversarial nature, and often remain insufficient for realistic safety scenarios involving planning, tool use, and multi-step reasoning, causing measured safety performance to overestimate real deployment robustness. To address this gap, we present Yuvion LLM, a large language model built for adversarially robust content safety and broader AI safety. Yuvion LLM treats adversarial robustness and agentic capability as first-class objectives. Its pipeline combines adversarially aware data construction, knowledge-enhanced continued pretraining, and policy-grounded multi-task safety post-training, including risk-aware supervised fine-tuning and reinforcement learning-based policy optimization, together with safety-aware agentic reinforcement learning for tool use and multi-step reasoning in complex safety scenarios. We further introduce the Yuvion LLM RiskEval (YLRE), a collection of 93 benchmarks across four evaluation categories, covering diverse open and internal evaluations with a focus on safety, adversarial robustness, and real-world capability requirements. Across these evaluations, Yuvion LLM demonstrates clear advantages on safety-focused benchmarks and particularly strong robustness under adversarial conditions, while maintaining solid overall capability. Notably, Yuvion-8B outperforms most state-of-the-art baselines, including substantially larger models such as GPT-5.4 and Qwen3-MAX, on several safety tasks.
Oyster-II is proposed, a reinforcement learning (RL)-based constructive safety alignment framework that adopts a Zero-RL paradigm combined with a multi-stage reinforcement learning strategy that comprehensively surpasses both Qwen3-14B and its predecessor Oyster-I on safety dimensions.
Jiyang Guan, Yong Xie, Jun Chen et al.· 0 citations
Experiments show that with only 1K synthesized samples, AdvSafe-aligned LRMs achieve significantly stronger jailbreak robustness than existing baselines, with almost no utility degradation, demonstrating that learning unsafety knowledge enables a superior robustness-utility trade-off and generalizes beyond seen attack patterns.
Hongli Shen, Shaopeng Fu, Qinbo Zhang et al.· 0 citations
This survey provides a comprehensive analysis of adversarial prompting strategies, ranging from input manipulation techniques to semantic and structural distortions, and explores defense strategies across preprocessing, model-level, postprocessing, and hybrid strategies, highlighting recent advances and their limitations.
A. Nasution, Ahmet Emre Ergün, Aytu˘g Onan et al.· IEEE Access· 0 citations
RLShield is a dynamic jailbreak detection framework that employs reinforcement learning for adaptive threshold selection and incorporates three key innovations: a dynamic retrieval and LLM-based rewriting module to simulate diverse adversarial contexts; a cross-layer representation analysis to pinpoint safety-critical parameters; and a Soft Actor-Critic based agent that learns to predict optimal, sample-specific detection thresholds.
Zhao Tong, Pengfei Yang, Yimeng Gu et al.· Annual Meeting of the Associ...· 0 citations
Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) are increasingly deployed for nuanced content safety and moderation tasks, yet they remain vulnerable to adversarial attacks and out-of-distribution edge cases. Traditional active learning and manual annotation fail to scale against the complexity and volume of novel multimodal threats. In this paper, we propose an automated, agentic red-teaming framework that systematically synthesizes difficult examples using an iterative strategy that proposes novel hypotheses as well as mutating on past attempts. Leveraging a multi-agent architecture that consists of a high-reasoning Architect agent, an advanced image generator, and a multi-level verification committee of LLM raters, our system autonomously uncovers boundary-pushing violations and ambiguous policy edge cases without any human intervention. By employing these carefully synthesized adversarial examples as in-context demonstrations via test-time Retrieval, we substantially improve the target model's robustness, reducing the False Negative Rate (FNR) from 41.2% to 24.5% in a public image safety benchmark without relying on any human labeling.
Genglin Liu, Muye Zhang, Krishnamurthy Viswanathan et al.· 0 citations