Many attacks against workloads running on multi-tenant systems are multi-step and history-dependent: sequences of innocuous operations whose malicious nature emerges only over an execution trace. Defending against them requires security policies that are stateful, are enforced within the kernel, and have a precise semantics. Currently deployed proposals fail on at least one count: kernel's built-in syscall filtering and classical MAC frameworks are stateless, while current eBPF-based tools express their policies through ad hoc YAML rules that cannot capture temporal relations among events, and whose semantics is defined only by the implementation. We present BPFence, an in-kernel runtime-verification framework that satisfies the properties above. BPFence provides a policy language with a formal semantics that can express temporal relations among events. It also provides a type system that statically distinguishes events the kernel can control from those it can only observe. Every well-typed policy is compiled into a finite-state monitor proved correct with respect to its semantics, and then into eBPF programs that run inside the kernel. We evaluate BPFence on seven case studies drawn from real-world attack patterns, and on a set of micro- and macro-benchmarks to show that the enforcement overhead remains compatible with production deployment.
It is argued that this gap leaves an irreducible residual of undetected attacks wherever inputs and actions are not restricted in advance to an enumerated set, and systematize defenses across runtime monitoring, architectural separation, and authorization.
Li Zhang, Yang Sun, Jie Shi· arXiv.org· 1 citation
This work designs Safe⟨ T⟩, an automaton-theoretic runtime monitoring framework for specifying and enforcing control-flow and data-aware policies over black-box distributed systems and builds a distributed runtime monitor on top of an emerging network infrastructure layer that can control inter-component communication.
Karuna Grewal· Companion Proceedings of the...· 0 citations
Results show that formal temporal monitoring adds value exactly when the trace exposes trustworthy history, and quantify how far current benchmarks are from that point and propose a twelve-field enforcement-ready trace schema.
Nikolaos Kekatos, Stylianos Basagiannis, Marinelio Chintri et al.· Proceedings of the 2026 8th...· 3 citations· ⚡1
Implementing Security Technical Implementation Guide (STIG) controls remains a demanding operating-system administration task. Each natural-language security requirement must be translated into a precise and persistent configuration change. These changes span Secure Shell (SSH) configuration, authentication policy, aud...
Manohar Vellala, Soumya Banerjee, Sandip Roy et al.· 0 citations
An LLM agent that reads untrusted content, such as an email or a web page, may follow instructions hidden in it. Noninterference is too strong for such agents, since a useful agent lets untrusted content influence what it does and may disclose the user's data by design, and declassification needs a release policy writt...
Language models are entering systems whose failures matter: vehicles, industrial toolchains, and autonomous agents acting on real infrastructure. At the same time, emerging regulation and safety standards demand not merely safe behavior but evidence of it that a third party can re-check. This survey traces a single arc...
Kamal Essam· International Journal of Ele...· 0 citations
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