Cambridge Platonism and the Reception of Spinoza in 17th century England

Abstract

This article examines the reception of Spinoza’s philosophy in seventeenth-century England, focusing on Henry More and Anne Conway within the circle of the Cambridge Platonists. Taking as its point of departure Spinoza’s claim that the human mind possesses an adequate idea of God which nevertheless often remains inoperative, the paper reconstructs how his immanent monism was interpreted as atheism, enthusiasm, or mysticism. Drawing on the historiographical work of Rosalind Colie (1963) and Sarah Hutton (1984), we revisit the circulation of the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus and the early manuscript versions of the Ethics, arguing that Conway’s Principles constitutes one of the earliest sustained engagements with Spinoza in English. By analyzing More’s defense of divine transcendence and Conway’s reflections on inspiration, imagination, and moral transformation, we show that their critiques implicitly address the operative force of ideas in shaping behavior. The seventeenth-century debate over Spinozism thus anticipates contemporary discussions in the cognitive science of religion concerning imagination, affect, and the regulation of belief.