Contesting the US Positions on Reforming the World Trade Organization

Abstract

The reform of the World Trade Organization (WTO) has become a focal point of contemporary trade governance debates, with the US re-engaging the institution while simultaneously challenging its foundational principles. This article critically examines recent US positions on WTO reform, specifically proposals to dilute the most-favoured-nation principle, recalibrate special and differential treatment, render security exceptions fully self-judging, and exclude contemporary trade concerns from multilateral governance. Situating these interventions within a broader theoretical account of hegemonic power and international law, the article argues that the US under President Trump is acting as a hostile change agent seeking to reshape, rather than merely reinterpret, WTO norms in response to a global power rivalry with China. While framed as necessary modernization, these proposals risk transforming a rules-based multilateral trading system into a power-based order and, in the long run, legitimizing it, with disproportionate adverse effects on developing countries. The US reform agenda risks undermining the very order it once built, weakening multilateral constraints while opening space for greater global instability and rival hegemonic influence.