Why Moore Was Basically Right: Reply to Crispin Wright

Abstract

Crispin Wright urges that there is a compelling skeptical argument that the method of my book, How to Take Skepticism Seriously (OUP, 2024), cannot satisfactorily address. This charge is incorrect, as this paper explains: materials already in the book provide a satisfactory response. The paper clarifies my approach of working from within the ordinary, pre-philosophical epistemic position, detailing methodological obligations it involves and highlighting ways in which Wright mischaracterizes the nature of my response to skeptical argumentation. The paper then directly confronts the skeptical argument offered by Wright, showing how it involves requirements that are belied by the commitments of ordinary epistemic practice (as shown by clear examples). Wright offers nothing whatsoever in favor of these requirements, and the only example he provides does not do the needed work. His skeptical argument consequently fails. The paper ends with some lessons from this discussion.