Adapted Idea as Adapting Method: Xunzi’s Conception of ‘Ritual’ (li) in Robert Neville’s Intercultural Philosophy

Abstract

This article offers a comparative analysis of two approaches to intercultural philosophizing: the strong (‘language-centric’) model of intercultural philosophy, which requires deep linguistic competence in both traditions, and the weak (‘language-free’) model of Boston Confucianism, as developed in the works of Robert Neville. Examining Neville’s interpretation of ancient Chinese philosopher Xunzi’s (3th century BC) doctrine of ‘ritual’ (li), the article argues that despite the theoretical vulnerability of renouncing linguistic competence, this approach has a significant practical advantage: it lowers the threshold of entry into intercultural dialogue, thereby expanding the circle of potential participants. Moreover, the interpretation itself proves to be philosophically productive: Neville reinterprets ritual as a ‘meta-sign’ that shapes habits of behavior (drawing on Charles S. Peirce’s semiotics) and proposes an ethics focused on concrete practices, making Xunzi’s teaching a viable tool for analyzing and harmonizing contemporary intercultural interactions. At the same time, a common problem inherent in both paradigms is identified: neither approach adequately addresses the question of the practical implementation of its ideas. Neither of them specifies concrete mechanisms or agents for realizing its declared principles, suggesting an ‘underformulation’ of the projects and casting doubt on their applicability beyond academic discourse.