Egalitarianism is not equality: Moving from outcome to process in the study of human political organisation

Abstract

Short Abstract Many traditional subsistence groups have been described as ‘egalitarian societies’. Here we demonstrate, empirically, that nominally egalitarian societies are often unequal across seven interconnected domains. We also highlight evidence that individuals in nominally egalitarian societies do not unfailingly adhere to strong equality preferences. We propose a different operational framework for understanding egalitarianism, highlighting individuals’ social status, resource access, and autonomy motives. This framework clarifies the plural processes (demand-sharing, risk-pooling, status-levelling, prosocial reputation-building, consensus-based collective decision-making, and residential mobility) by which relative equality is maintained. We finish with suggestions for better operationalizing egalitarianism in future research. Long Abstract Many traditional subsistence groups have been described as ‘egalitarian societies’. Definitions of ‘egalitarianism’, especially beyond anthropology, have often emphasised equality in resource access, prestige or rank, alongside generalised preferences for fairness and equality. However, there are no human societies where equality is genuinely realised in all areas of life. Here we demonstrate, empirically, that nominally egalitarian societies are often unequal across seven important interconnected domains: embodied capital, social capital, leadership, gender, age/knowledge, material capital/land tenure, and reproduction. We also highlight evidence that individuals in nominally egalitarian societies do not unfailingly adhere to strong equality preferences. We propose a new operational framework for understanding egalitarianism in traditional subsistence groups, focussing on individual motivations, rather than equality. We redefine ‘egalitarian societies’ as those where socio-ecological circumstances enable most individuals to successfully secure their own resource access, social status, and autonomy. We show how this emphasis on self-interest — particularly status concerns, resource access and autonomy — dispels naive enlightenment notions of the ‘noble savage’, and clarifies the plural processes (demand-sharing, risk-pooling, status-levelling, prosocial reputation-building, consensus-based collective decision-making, and residential mobility) by which relative equality is maintained. We finish with suggestions for better operationalizing egalitarianism in future research.