This work presents FAVA (Formal Authorization for Verified Agents), a permission-carrying authorization framework for agent execution that utilizes an LLM-guided Permission Intermediate Representation to translate ambiguous natural-language tasks into structured constraints.
Abstract
Large language model (LLM) agents autonomously interleave semantic reasoning with complex system operations. In these dynamic environments, static tool-level permissions are fundamentally insufficient; safe authorization is highly context-dependent and heavily reliant on evolving runtime states and data flows. We present FAVA (Formal Authorization for Verified Agents), a permission-carrying authorization framework for agent execution. FAVA utilizes an LLM-guided Permission Intermediate Representation (IR) to translate ambiguous natural-language tasks into structured constraints. A deterministic lowering pass then converts this IR into an evidence-backed permission graph that explicitly tracks data flows, dependencies, and contextual labels. To provide strict security guarantees, a Satisfiability Modulo Theories (SMT) authorizer mathematically verifies the current graph against security policies before any effectful action executes. A runtime gateway then enforces the solver's result, either authorizing the execution or intercepting it with a precise counterexample. We evaluate FAVA across OpenAgentSafety, OctoBench, and ActPlane scenarios. Our evaluation demonstrates that FAVA achieves a 90.5% Decision Compliance Rate (DCR) over the aggregate dataset, successfully intercepting dynamic violating traces in the evaluated trace-conditioned scenarios.
Across the evaluated sinks, CXI admits execution only when field, effect, and invocation authority bind to the same action manifest, and across the evaluated sinks, CXI admits execution only when field, effect, and invocation authority bind to the same action manifest.
SkillGuard is presented, a harness-level enforcement layer that treats this event as contamination and restricts future capabilities to disconnect the resulting state from deployer-defined forbidden states and preserves substantially more capabilities than binary restriction at the same attack success rate.
Wu-Jie Xiong, Rabimba Karanjai, Yang Lu et al.· 2 citations
AgentFlow, a flow-centric policy language and runtime enforcement model for specifying where data may travel in agent systems, is presented and results are preliminary and scoped to the modeled policy-visible agent behaviors and evaluated benchmarks.
The results show that plan-first execution combined with label-preserving persistence can substantially strengthen persistent LLM agents, while revealing an important security-utility tradeoff introduced by strict integrity enforcement.
AgentGuardUtil is presented, the authors' entry to CAR-bench Track~1, which treats the AI planer (LLM) as a fallible proposer inside a grounded verify-and-revise loop, and its core novelty is a runtime policy compiler.
R. Bouchekir, D. Safin, Tomas Bueno Momcilovic· 0 citations
It is argued that semantic RAG is fundamentally unsuited for rule enforcement, and that Euclid-MCP can serve as a stable, shared reasoning substrate for both RAG-based assistants and agentic systems.
Bartolomeo Bogliolo· arXiv.org· 1 citation
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