Quine's Quandaries

Abstract

The Transcript of the 1986 Stanford Conversation records how Quine grapples with the inconsistencies he seeks and finds in his own views. Why was Quine so reluctant and ambivalent concerning propositional attitudes— “the mental”—including the propositional attitudes of empathy? The hypothesis explored in this article is that Quine’s acceptance of the mental effected central, deep changes to his theory, so that we witness him being torn between simplicity and conservation as he continued to improve on his web of belief. Quine’s pragmatism and commitment to the hypothetico-deductive method required him to adjust his existing web of belief in light of new findings and systematic thinking, including the aims of science construed—“Wissenschaft”, the epistemic virtues, the role of prediction, and his preference for physical objects. Section 2 considers Quine’s acceptance of mental notions; Section 3 focuses on the propositional attitudes of empathy in particular. Section 4 sketches some of the ramifications of this change for the aims of science broadly construed—“Wissenschaft”—and hence of epistemic virtues, and for the role of prediction.