The theory of D. I. Dubrovsky and the hard problem of consciousness

Abstract

This article offers a critical analysis of D. I. Dubrovsky’s informational theory of conscious ness, which claims to solve the hard problem. At the center of the theory is the idea that consciousness is a special kind of information, instantiated in the brain but subjectively perceived “in pure form”, without reference to the physical properties of neural processes. The paper examines the core concepts and claims of this theory, tracing its origins to the cybernetic-functionalist tradition in Soviet philosophy and its aspiration to establish a scientific, interdisciplinary framework. Despite its materialist orientation and explicit rejection of reductionism, Dubrovsky’s theory fails to resolve the central challenge posed by phenomenal consciousness — the problem of explaining why subjective experience arises from objective brain processes. The article argues that Dubrovsky’s overly broad and undifferentiated notion of information leads to a conflation of first- and third-person perspectives, undermining any coherent account of the transition from brain activity to conscious experience. The analysis also identifies a latent “intuitive dualism” in the theory — namely, the assumption that the self can consciously control the brain — creating a tension with the theory’s stated materialist commitments. It is concluded that while Dubrovsky’s theory presents valuable insights for understanding the functional aspects of consciousness, it ultimately substitutes the hard problem with a more tractable explanatory task. Significant revision of its conceptual apparatus, clarification of the explanatory perspectives, and a more precise account of the ontological status of consciousness are necessary before the theory can qualify even as a solution to one of the “easy” problems of consciousness.