Institutional Ambition, Structural Constraint: Explaining the Limits of the African Union’s Security Regime

Abstract

Why do regional security institutions frequently underperform despite ambitious mandates and sustained external support? Much of the existing literature attributes institutional weakness to external interference, capacity deficits, or principal–agent problems. However, these approaches remain limited in their ability to explain why such weaknesses persist despite repeated reforms and continued investment. This article advances a structural alternative focused on the African Union (AU). It develops a three-pillar framework to explain institutional underperformance: first, the domestic political orders of member states, which transmit weak governance norms, sovereignty sensitivities, and survival-oriented incentives into regional institutions; second, institutional design constraints that generate decision-making paralysis, selective enforcement, and implementation deficits; and third, patterns of external financial dependence, which sustain operations while simultaneously constraining autonomous reform and political ownership. Methodologically, the study adopts a qualitative, theory-driven approach, drawing on secondary literature and illustrative cases from Mali, Chad, and the Central African Republic to demonstrate how these dynamics interact in practice. Rather than treating dysfunction as episodic or managerial, the article conceptualizes weakness as structurally embedded in the interaction among these three pillars. By integrating domestic political incentives, institutional architecture, and external dependence into a unified analytical framework, the study contributes to broader debates on regional security governance and challenges prevailing assumptions about institutional strengthening and performance.