Non-concave Corporate Management with Option Incentives under Value-at-Risk Constraint

Abstract

This article studies a dynamic corporate risk management problem by considering the decision-making of risk-averse managers who exert costly effort and select project risk. We study how a Value-at-Risk (VaR) constraint affects managerial decisions and the distribution of firm value when the manager's objective is non-concave with a fixed salary and options. By the concavification technique, we analyze the optimal terminal firm value on the concave envelope of the objective function. Applying the quantile formulation and the martingale approach, we can derive explicit solutions for optimal effort, terminal firm value, and project choice. The optimal terminal firm value can be divided into nine cases by carefully discussing the choices of VaR floor and tail probability. Compared with the benchmark case, we find that a VaR manager will smooth terminal firm value across states, reducing it in good states while supporting it in adverse states. Moreover, a VaR requirement generally improves downside protection and reduces bankruptcy probability when the VaR floor is low or moderate. However, when the VaR floor is sufficiently high, it can increase bankruptcy probability and induce gambling-for-recovery behavior in adverse states. Our sensitivity analysis indicates that greater managerial effort uniformly improves firm value. Moreover, more incentive options make managers more responsible, leading to a smoother terminal firm value across states. In contrast, a high fixed salary makes the manager less responsible and ultimately causes a more dispersed firm value.