Financial Regulatory Intensity and Corporate Liquidity Risk: Evidence from Chinese A-Share Listed Companies

Abstract

Against the backdrop of escalating financial regulation in China, this study examines how regulatory enforcement intensity affects corporate liquidity risk among A-share listed non-financial firms over 2015–2024. We construct a composite regional regulatory intensity index (Enforce) integrating the frequency and monetary magnitude of administrative penalties issued by local securities regulators and employ firm- and year-fixed-effects panel regressions with the current ratio (CR) as the primary liquidity measure. We find that tighter regulatory enforcement significantly depresses the current ratio, consistent with a compliance-cost channel that constrains short-term debt-servicing capacity. Mediation analysis—conducted separately for each ESG sub-dimension and verified via bootstrap tests—reveals that the corporate governance dimension (G) generates a significant positive indirect effect (consistent partial mediation), the social responsibility dimension (S) generates a significant negative indirect effect (competing partial mediation), and the environmental dimension (E) yields no statistically significant indirect effect. Ownership-type heterogeneity tests confirm that non-state-owned enterprises (non-SOEs) are substantially more sensitive to regulatory tightening than state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Moderation analysis further shows that financial leverage plays a non-monotonic role: the regulation–liquidity effect is negative at low leverage levels and reverses to positive above an estimated threshold (Lev ≈ 0.56). Robustness is established through subsample regressions and a lagged-variable endogeneity test. These findings enrich the institutional finance literature and provide evidence-based guidance for differentiated regulatory policymaking.