Two Interpretations of John Locke’s Hypothesis of Thinking Matter Possibility

Abstract

The article examines various interpretations in 18th-century philosophy of Locke’s supposition that matter could think. According to Locke, since there is no contradiction between the ideas of matter and thought, we cannot, by our own faculties and without revelation, know whether the Creator has endowed certain systems of matter with the capacity to perceive and think, or whether an immaterial thinking substance has been somehow annexed to matter. The analysis shows that interpretive strategies regarding this hypothesis can be divided into epistemological and metaphysical ones. Metaphysical strategies, proceeding from a definite conception of matter and its natural properties (extension and solidity), focus on the possibility of adding to these natural properties an additional one – namely, thought – and rely on examples of qualities that have been superadded to matter by God (among which the force of gravity is cited). The epistemological strategy rests on a general agnosticism concerning real essences and the internal properties of things: since the essence of matter is unknown, it is likewise unknown whether it can think. The article also demonstrates that, from the standpoint of opponents of materialism, these differing interpretations of the hypothesis require distinct counterarguments: the epistemological one is refuted by pointing out that we do know the essence of matter, or of extension, while the metaphysical one is refuted by demonstrating that thought cannot be superadded to matter in the same manner as is the case with gravity. The conclusions drawn by the author of the article are based on an examination of the positions of such 18th-century thinkers as Voltaire, Diderot, Holbach, Condillac, and Priestley.