Aug 2026· arXiv.org· Vol abs/2608.19959· 0 citations· 45 references
Computer ScienceEngineering
TL;DR
Findings show that human perception alone is unreliable for the selected modern and partial-spoof conditions and motivate procedural verification, provenance, watermarking, and segment-level detection.
Abstract
Advances in speech synthesis have made deepfake audio highly realistic. Earlier studies reported 70-80% human detection accuracy, but relied primarily on older synthesizers. We compare human detection for three selected voice synthesis tools released in 2019, 2022, and 2024 with 82 IT professionals, and benchmark humans against six pretrained detectors on the same material. For fully synthetic speech (full spoofs), the F1 score drops from about 90% for RTVC and YourTTS to 48% for ElevenLabs, although listeners were explicitly warned that deepfakes were present. For partial spoofing, where only one sentence of an utterance is altered, strict accuracy falls to 9%, and listeners classify the synthetic sentence as bona fide 77% of the time. Humans and detectors fail in complementary ways, and neither reliably localizes short manipulations. Additionally, listeners increasingly mislabel bona fide speech as fake, eroding trust in unmanipulated audio. These findings show that human perception alone is unreliable for the selected modern and partial-spoof conditions and motivate procedural verification, provenance, watermarking, and segment-level detection.
Real-world audio recordings for deepfake detection rarely consist solely of speech; they often are mixtures of speech and background events that themselves may also be synthetic. When processing these mixtures, it remains unclear whether detectors attend to the speech or the background event, and where their spectral e...
The increasing prevalence of spoofing attacks in automatic speaker verification systems underscores the critical need for robust detection methods to ensure security and reliability. Although current spoof speech datasets primarily focus on synthesized speech and voice conversion attacks, human-imitated speech remains...
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A compact front-end screen that processes all inputs cheaply and forwards only suspicious recordings for more expensive analysis is investigated, demonstrating the potential of decoder-guided acoustic evidence for low-cost front-end screening.
Speech recognition still works poorly for many people whose speech is affected by conditions such as ALS, Parkinson's disease, cerebral palsy, Down syndrome or stroke. We took part in the Speech Accessibility Project Challenge 2 (SAPC2) with a public speech recognizer that we fine-tuned on the challenge data. Our best...
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Ariel Bitan, Danny Hendler, Yisroel Mirsky· Proceedings of the 2nd ACM W...· 0 citations
Modern generative audio can fabricate not only voices but also the acoustic environments that provide evidence of when and where speech occurred. This capability undermines a longstanding forensic assumption that background sound provides reliable evidence of a recording's provenance. Yet existing detectors produce onl...
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