The Russian Army’s Persian Campaign of 1722-1723: Multitasking of Goals and Ambiguity of Results

Abstract

Introduction. This article examines the events surrounding the Russian Empire's political leadership's attempts to address a number of geopolitical, economic, and related issues on the country's southern borders. The aim was not only to significantly strengthen control over the southern borderlands but also to secure new opportunities for projecting military and political influence into new, distant territories. The aim was to achieve political dominance and economic dividends throughout the Caspian region, laying the groundwork for advancing its interests in Central Asia and India. The author also sought to prevent the Ottomans from entering the region and significantly weaken their ability to influence the ethno-states of the Northeast Caucasus and Georgia. The successful conclusion of the Northern War made these objectives possible for Russia. Materials and Methods. The study is based on the principles of historicism and scientific objectivity, and also draws on a number of historical methods that made it possible to comprehensively understand the studied source and historiographic base, drawing on a large number of documentary sources and scholarly works by Russian and foreign historians of different generations, dedicated to the socio-political processes that took place in the North Caucasus and adjacent territories in the first quarter of the 18th century. Analysis. The author of the article points to the important role of diplomacy in the actions of Peter I, who tried to conceal his true intentions from both Istanbul and the Shah's authorities, giving his actions in the region the character of a police action aimed at suppressing the rebels and protecting his subjects. At the same time, the assessment of the general political situation is based on the works of P.G. Butkov and J. Bell, who pointed out the instability of the political preferences of local feudal lords, who were highly dependent on the influence and balance of external forces. The author also agrees with the opinion of D.A. Korsakov and S.M. Solovyov, who emphasized the exceptional role of the Astrakhan governor A.P. Volynsky in St. Petersburg's decision to launch an expedition to the Caspianregion. An important part of the analysis included ideas and provisions drawn from the works of researchers of the Soviet and postSoviet periods of Russian historiography and foreign scholars. Results. Based on the results of the study of historical materials from central archival repositories and presented in collections of official documents, as well as taking into account the opinions of Russian historians I. V. Kurukin, V. V. Lapin, V. P. Lyscov, N. A. Sotavov, N. D. Chekulaev and others, with the involvement of works by foreign scholars Charles King, Robert Massey, Lindsay Hughes and contemporary Iranian researchers, the author came to the conclusion that the need for the Russian army's campaign in the Caspian region was dictated by the new international role and capabilities of the Russian state associated with the results of the Northern War; new geopolitical challenges facing Russia, but was not fully realized due to a number of factors.