CARTELIZED PARLIAMENT AND THE DECLINE OF LEGISLATIVE OVERSIGHT IN INDONESIA’S MULTIPARTY PRESIDENTIALISM

Abstract

This article examines the tendency of the Indonesian House of Representatives (DPR RI) in the 2024–2029 term to move towards a cartelized parliament in Indonesia's multiparty presidential system. This article discusses how the governing coalition's over-dominance after the 2024 elections weakens the parliamentary opposition and reduces the effectiveness of checks and balances on the executive. The study uses a qualitative explanatory approach with a single-case study design, process tracking, and documentary analysis. Data were drawn from official state and parliamentary documents, KPU decisions, legislative agendas, democracy monitoring reports, credible media coverage, and public statements by political elites. The findings show that the DPR remains electorally plural, yet most party factions are politically absorbed into the governing coalition. As a result, its legislative, budgetary, and oversight functions tend to operate through elite accommodation rather than democratic control. The case of the revision of the TNI Law, the revision of the Police Law, the 2026 state budget, public protests over parliamentary allowances, and a heavy legislative agenda reveal the weakening of substantive opposition and the shift of criticism to spaces outside parliament. The article concludes that democratic deterioration can occur legally and procedurally when parliament remains formally functioning but loses its corrective capacity towards the executive.