This work proposes Wrapper-Based Intent-Form Augmentation (WIFA), an automatic intent-group augmentation method that pairs wrapped harmful examples with structurally matched wrapped benign counterexamples, requiring no external teacher or manual per-wrapper intent labels.
Abstract
Safety tuning can improve harmful refusal, but models may learn surface-form shortcuts: wrapped harmful prompts bypass safety, while similarly wrapped benign prompts are over-refused. We propose Wrapper-Based Intent-Form Augmentation (WIFA), an automatic intent-group augmentation method that pairs wrapped harmful examples with structurally matched wrapped benign counterexamples, requiring no external teacher or manual per-wrapper intent labels. We use WIFA as a common data layer for two complementary fine-tuning routes: WIFA-Boost, a two-stage high-safety recipe, and Anchored Group-Consistent Refusal Training (A-GCRT), which regularizes refusal/compliance decision scores across same-intent wrappers and anchors harmful and benign groups on opposite sides of a margin. In the Qwen setting, WIFA-Boost reaches the strongest transformed-harmful refusal, while A-GCRT reduces OR-Bench over-refusal from 25.7\% for the base model to 17.4\%; reproduced baselines do not match these operating points. Llama results and ablations over data structure, two-stage order, and A-GCRT components support this intent-group interpretation without claiming universal below-base over-refusal.
To mitigate the refusal-cue shortcut, sparse complementary masking is adapted as a lightweight post-hoc intervention that identifies and suppresses a small set of shortcut-associated attention heads and MLP neurons without retraining and achieves an approximately 79% relative reduction in response-initial detection fai...
Yu Feng, Chun-Ting Zang, Chen Shen et al.· 1 citation
No post-training method achieves all three properties the authors would want from safe alignment at once: refusal that isn't concentrated in a few fragile components, safety gains that don't cost general capability, and safety behavior correctable through small, targeted edits.
Hoang Cuong Nguyen, M. Dras, Usman Naseem· 1 citation
The results support model-specific operating-point selection: set a deployment target and retain only interventions that improve it, and retain only interventions that improve it.
Experiments across three instruction-tuned models show that HiRoute achieves high safety rates across multiple safety benchmarks while preserving safe-response helpfulness, reducing over-refusal, and maintaining competitive performance on general-purpose tasks.
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An exploratory study involving over 30,000 real-world agent interaction records and 45 stand-up comedians reveals practical safety concerns in LLM-based content humorization, and proposes a prompt injection attack that exploits latent risks in humor-based defenses.
Yu Cui, Ruiqing Yue, Tingyu Li et al.· arXiv.org· 0 citations
IntentAlign-MiniLM, the authors' 22M-parameter intent-aligned retriever, outperforms much larger embedding models on held-out intent retrieval and yields the best learned-retriever harmful recall across tested guardrails.
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