This paper presents an architecture for verifiable container image distribution that addresses key-management challenges and enables policy-enforced admission-time verification, and implements a proof-of-concept integrated with GitHub Actions and GitLab Runners that mitigates common supply-chain attacks under a realistic threat model.
Abstract
Containerized workloads are commonly built via CI/CD pipelines, stored in registries, and executed across heterogeneous infrastructures, including cloud and edge environments. A single compromised build step or credential can turn routine automation into large-scale distribution of malicious artifacts, motivating integrity, transparency, and enforceable deployment-time checks. In this paper, we present an architecture for verifiable container image distribution that addresses key-management challenges and enables policy-enforced admission-time verification. A transparency service generates one-time signing keys bound to authenticated identities, records signing events in an append-only transparency registry, and returns cryptographically verifiable proofs of inclusion. These proofs and identity attributes are attached to image metadata and evaluated by policy-as-code at admission time, so only compliant artifacts are deployed. We implement a proof-of-concept integrated with GitHub Actions and GitLab Runners and evaluate how the resulting pipeline mitigates common supply-chain attacks under a realistic threat model.
A secure CI/CD update workflow that combines keyless Cosign signing (OIDC/Fulcio), immutable SHA-256 digest–based image addressing, mandatory pre-deployment signature verification, and freshness controls against rollback attacks is presented, while permitting controlled rollback only to previously verified versions.
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