Implicit Philosophies of Science: Academics’ Divergent Views of Subjectivity in Scientific Practice

Abstract

Assumptions about the role of subjectivity in science shape how knowledge is constructed, validated, and communicated, yet these assumptions are often implicit, particularly within the natural sciences, which are frequently characterized as objective. This study examines how academics conceptualize the role of subjectivity in the natural sciences and whether shared understandings exist. Using Q methodology, participants sorted a set of statements derived in part from Evelyn Fox Keller’s reflections on scientific practice, enabling the systematic identification of distinct viewpoints. Analysis revealed two divergent perspectives. The first, The Ideal is Objective Science , emphasizes objectivity, empirical rigor, and the minimization of subjectivity, reflecting assumptions aligned with Karl Popper’s critical rationalism. The second, Scientists as Human Beings , foregrounds the inescapable role of human judgment, interpretation, and context in scientific work, emphasizing communication and collaboration, and resonating with Thomas Kuhn’s account of scientific practice. Importantly, participants did not explicitly reference these philosophical frameworks, suggesting that such orientations may operate implicitly within academic thinking. The findings indicate the presence of distinct epistemic positions regarding subjectivity in science. This divergence raises important questions about how science is represented and taught, particularly when assumptions about objectivity and subjectivity remain unexamined. By empirically identifying competing viewpoints, this study contributes to ongoing discussions in science education and philosophy of science concerning the role of subjectivity in scientific inquiry.