A dignidade humana na era da inteligência artificial à luz da Magnifica Humanitas

Abstract

This article investigates how the philosophical and theological foundations of human dignity can guide the ethical discernment of artificial intelligence, particularly in light of the encyclical Magnifica Humanitas. It adopts a bibliographical, hermeneutical, and theological-critical approach, engaging with the personalist tradition, the phenomenology of alterity, the philosophy of technology, the ethics of responsibility, and debates on transhumanism and posthumanism. The analysis argues that dignity does not derive from performance, functional autonomy, cognitive capacity, or social utility, but from the ontological value of the person, understood as a bodily, relational, free, vulnerable being open to transcendence. The technocratic paradigm is examined as a framework in which efficiency, calculation, predictability, and optimization tend to become normative criteria of social life, fostering the algorithmic reduction of the person to data, profiles, and behavioral patterns. The article also discusses the distinction between human intelligence and computational performance, as well as the risks associated with opacity, concentration of power, relational simulation, and unequal enhancement. It concludes that the Incarnation, Trinitarian communion, and ontological dignity provide criteria for technological governance oriented toward the common good, justice, responsibility, care, and the protection of vulnerable persons, without rejecting the benefits of science, medicine, accessibility, and technological innovation.