Variation in the Epistemic Authority of Science in Climate Change: A Comparative Study of UK and US Legislative Committees

Abstract

The epistemic authority of international climate science has been constructed and defended by institutions, policymakers, and scientists. Mirroring these efforts, scholarship on climate change-related science–policy interactions has focused on how epistemic authority is reinforced, contested, or mobilised within policy arenas. Less well examined is what is represented as constituting that authority in policymaking settings, and how such representations vary across institutional contexts. This gap is examined through a comparative case study of UK and US legislative committees. Drawing on Gieryn’s concept of boundary work, as originally conceived, the article examines how committee members demarcated science from non-science through representations of qualities associated with the epistemic authority of climate science. The analysis identified four recurring categories through which what counted as authoritative science was specified: correspondence between theory and observations, handling of uncertainty, science as evolving or settled, and modes of determining validity. These categories appeared in both UK and US committee material, but the representations within them took different forms across the two settings. Jasanoff’s civic epistemology is then used interpretively to examine the public terms through which representations within those categories took different forms in the UK and US committee material. Of Jasanoff’s six dimensions, demonstration practices, public accountability, and participatory styles provide the clearest interpretive orientation. The findings suggest the value of analysing how the bases of epistemic authority are specified in institutional settings where climate science, including IPCC assessments, is interpreted and assessed.