The effect of in-person versus remote others on moral decision making

Abstract

People often assume that moral decisions reflect stable internal moral values, yet research suggests they are context-dependent, especially in the context of emotionally charged dilemmas. One such context is perceived observation. When observed, people typically shift away from utilitarian judgments (i.e., maximize the greatest good) toward more deontological judgments (i.e., do not intentional harm). Prior work has been limited to highly unrealistic dilemmas in which the action is confounded with the utilitarian option. In addition, no study has examined the role of compared remote vs. in-person presence of others on moral decision making. The current study examined (a) the effect of observation type on moral decision-making in the context of historical moral dilemmas, (b) affective and cognitive predictors of utilitarian preference, and (c) the effect of framing on moral decision-making. Participants (N=136 undergraduate students) were assigned to one of three conditions: Alone (in the lab; n = 52), Remote Observation (3+ participants in a zoom room with cameras on; n =52), and In-Person Observation (3+ participants in the lab; n = 32). Participants completed a survey consisting of 12 moral dilemmas and measures of mood, arousal, need for cognition, reputation concern, empathy, and perspective-taking. Observation type did not significantly affect utilitarian preference, F (2, 133) = 0.46, p=.631. Utilitarian preference was significantly predicted only by reputation concern and empathy. Specifically, utilitarian preference was associated with higher reputational concern (β = .258, p = .004) and lower empathy (β = −.188, p = .048). In addition, utilitarian preference varied by the framing of the moral dilemmas: Utilitarian preference was significantly higher for dilemmas in which the action coincides with the utilitarian decision (M = .80, SD = .21) than for dilemmas in which the action coincides with the deontological decision (M = .57, SD = .24), t(135) = 9.68, p < .001. The results suggest that the mere presence of peers may be insufficient to shift moral decision-making. Or, compared to unrealistic dilemmas, real ones may promote more internally driven moral judgments that are less sensitive to perceived observation. The relationship among utilitarian preference, reputation concern, and empathy is consistent with dual-process theories of morality which suggest that utilitarian judgments rely more on “cold” cognitive processes whereas deontological judgments are more strongly driven by emotional responses. In addition, the results highlight the importance of counterbalancing action with moral principle in studies based on moral dilemmas. Keywords: moral decision-making, moral judgment, moral dilemmas, utilitarian preference, deontology, social observation, peer presence, reputation concern.