THE SECURITIZATION OF TRADE AND THE ZANGEZUR CORRIDOR IN THE CHANGING WORLD ORDER: TÜRKİYE'S POLITICAL ECONOMY OF STRATEGIC AUTONOMY

Abstract

Debate over the Zangezur Corridor typically centers on distance, freight time, and logistics capacity. This study shifts the focus from transport efficiency to strategic autonomy by asking under what conditions the proposed link would expand Türkiye's strategic room for maneuver rather than generate a new form of dependence. The analysis draws on 18 authenticated official documents issued between November 2020 and June 2026 by Azerbaijan, Armenia, Iran, Türkiye, the United States, and the Organization of Turkic States. These documents are examined across nine interrelated categories: connectivity, route redundancy, securitization, sovereignty and jurisdiction, operational control, geoeconomic positioning, reciprocity, delegated commercial governance, and disputes over terminology. This framework traces a marked evolution in the corridor's institutional design. Russian border supervision under the 2020 trilateral statement gave way to the sovereignty-based Washington declaration of 2025 and, subsequently, to the Armenia-United States TRIPP arrangement of 2026. Under the published design, Armenia retains border and customs authority, while a United States-affiliated entity holds the controlling corporate share. For Türkiye, this creates a central tension: the corridor may provide an additional route, yet Türkiye has no formal role in the disclosed ownership or reserved-decision structure. The study conceptualizes this mismatch as a commercial sovereignty paradox. It argues that the corridor can enhance Türkiye's strategic autonomy only if access remains predictable, the route provides genuine substitution capacity, and alternative routes remain available. Connectivity, therefore, does not in itself guarantee autonomy; its strategic value depends on the governance and redundancy conditions under which it operates.