From Administrative Function to Professional Governance: Institutionalising Functional Specialisation for Corruption Prevention in Public Procurement

Abstract

Public procurement is highly vulnerable to corruption because it involves substantial public expenditure, considerable administrative discretion, fragmented institutional responsibilities, and technically complex contracting processes. Although recent anti-corruption reforms have increasingly focused on transparency, digital procurement, and institutional accountability, less attention has been given to functional specialisation as an independent preventive mechanism in procurement law and institutional design. This study examines how functional specialisation can help prevent corruption, assesses the extent to which Iraqi procurement legislation has incorporated this principle, and identifies relevant legislative lessons from Saudi Arabia and Indonesia. The study employs a qualitative doctrinal and comparative legal methodology, combining descriptive-analytical and functional comparative approaches. It analyses procurement legislation, implementing regulations, institutional arrangements, official documents, international procurement standards, and relevant peer-reviewed legal scholarship from Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Indonesia, with particular reference to OECD and World Bank procurement principles. The findings indicate that functional specialisation can strengthen corruption prevention when procurement responsibilities are entrusted to appropriately qualified personnel within clearly defined institutional structures, supported by competency requirements, professional certification, continuous training, conflict-of-interest controls, and institutional separation. The analysis further shows that, although Iraq has introduced procurement units and digitalisation, procurement has not yet been fully institutionalised as a specialised professional function. Saudi Arabia has developed stronger centralised governance and clearer separation of procurement responsibilities, while Indonesia has established a more formal professional model based on specialised procurement officials, competency certification, and structured professional development. The study contributes to comparative public procurement and anti-corruption scholarship by conceptualising functional specialisation as a distinct legal and institutional preventive mechanism rather than merely an administrative or human-resources measure. It also provides a comparative framework for strengthening Iraq’s procurement governance through specialised functions, competency-based requirements, professional development, and institutional integrity safeguards.