Mechanistic analyses show that a moderate neighborhood size enables individuals to strike an optimal balance between information sufficiency and decision-making tractability, which allows them to detect reciprocal opportunities while avoiding the deterioration of decision quality due to information overload.
Abstract
Cooperation is ubiquitous in both natural and human societies, yet its evolutionary basis remains a major challenge. A long-standing puzzle is whether having more information leads to better decision-making and thus a higher level of cooperation. To address this question, we adopt a recently developed reinforcement learning framework in which individuals learn through trial and error to maximize cumulative rewards - a paradigm that has successfully explained diverse emergent patterns in human behaviors. Specifically, we equip a structured population with the Q-learning algorithm and systematically vary the size of the interactive neighborhood, which serves as a proxy for perceived information. Interestingly, we observe a non-monotonic relationship between cooperation prevalence and neighborhood size in both two-dimensional square lattices and Barabasi-Albert scale-free networks. This inverted U-shaped dependence reveals that an optimal amount of information exists, yielding the highest level of cooperation. Mechanistic analyses show that a moderate neighborhood size enables individuals to strike an optimal balance between information sufficiency and decision-making tractability. This balance allows them to detect reciprocal opportunities while avoiding the deterioration of decision quality due to information overload. Our findings challenge everyday intuition, suggesting that a proper amount of information - not more - is optimal for the emergence of cooperation.
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