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DELEGATION AND DRIFT: A PRINCIPAL-AGENT READING OF LEGISLATIVE ACCOUNTABILITY AND SDG 4 IN NIGERIA’s FEDERAL CAPITAL TERRITORY (FCT)

Sep 2026 · International Journal of Business, Management, Behavioral Research and Innovations · 0 citations

Abstract

Nigeria’s National Assembly is constitutionally responsible for overseeing executive delivery of public goods, yet how this oversight functions in practice remains underexamined, particularly for sectors tied to global development commitments such as the Sustainable Development Goals. Drawing on Principal-Agent Theory rooted in Ross (1973), Mitnick (1975), and Jensen and Meckling (1976), and carried into public bureaucracy through Mitnick's (1980) and Waterman and Meier's (1998) work this study maps the delegation chain linking the National Assembly to the Federal Ministry of Education, the Universal Basic Education Commission, the FCT Education Secretariat, and Local Education Authorities in delivering Sustainable Development Goal 4 within Nigeria's Federal Capital Territory. Using mixed-methods survey and interview data from 369 stakeholders spanning this chain, collected between 2015 and 2023, the study finds that the National Assembly performs capably as a principal at the point of lawmaking (81.8% agreement) and representation (78.6%), but that oversight lags markedly behind (66.4%). This gap reflects information asymmetry, a fragmented multi-tier delegation structure prone to the "multiple-principal problem," and a dependence on executive self-reported data that leaves implementation drift largely undetected. The article situates this pattern within the wider comparative literature on bureaucratic accountability, tax administration, and education federalism, and distinguishes conventional agency loss from the "unprincipled principal" variant documented elsewhere in Nigerian public administration. It recommends independent real-time verification systems, binding sanctions for non-disclosure, and structured civil society verification channels, arguing that closing the gap requires continuous, independently sourced monitoring rather than more frequent conventional oversight.

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