BEYOND WEAK ANTHROPOCENTRISM: BRYAN G. NORTON AND THE POSSIBILITY OF RESPONSIBLE ANTHROPOCENTRISM

Abstract

The continuing environmental crisis has exposed the philosophical limitations of approaches that either place human interests at the centre of environmental decision making or seek to assign intrinsic moral value to the non human world. Bryan G. Norton’s theory of weak anthropocentrism represents one of the most influential attempts to move beyond this opposition. Norton argues that an adequate environmental ethic need not depend upon the controversial claim that nature possesses intrinsic value independent of human valuation. Instead, environmental responsibility can emerge from the reflective transformation of human preferences, particularly through the distinction between felt and considered preferences. His later account of convergence further maintains that individuals and communities holding different ethical world views may nevertheless arrive at substantially similar environmental policies. This article critically examines the philosophical adequacy of this position. It argues that Norton successfully exposes weaknesses in both crude anthropocentrism and certain forms of non anthropocentrism, particularly by demonstrating the importance of reflective judgement, democratic deliberation, scientific knowledge, and long term thinking. Nevertheless, weak anthropocentrism remains vulnerable at the point where rational preference is expected to become moral obligation. Considered preferences may encourage environmental protection, but preference alone cannot adequately explain why an agent ought to act responsibly when environmental protection conflicts with immediate interests. The article therefore proposes the idea of responsible anthropocentrism as a philosophical refinement of Norton’s position. Responsible anthropocentrism retains the human centred epistemological and moral orientation of Norton’s theory while introducing a stronger account of moral agency, accountability, stewardship, and intergenerational responsibility. The argument is that human centrality need not entail unrestricted human domination. Properly understood, human moral agency can instead become the ground of responsibility towards the natural conditions upon which human and social existence depend.