PUBLIC-SECTOR REFORM AND LONG-TERM DEVELOPMENT: BUILDING INSTITUTIONS THAT SURVIVE POLITICAL CYCLES IN NIGERIA

Abstract

Public-sector governance is indispensable for translating democratic mandates into sustainable socioeconomic development. However, more than six decades of post-independence administrative reform in Nigeria reveal a persistent paradox: despite successive waves of structural reorganisation, salary harmonisation, digital-governance initiatives, and anti-corruption frameworks, public institutions remain severely constrained by bureaucratic bottlenecks, prebendal patronage networks, capacity deficits, and acute vulnerability to political cycles. This study critically evaluates the evolution, political economy, and institutional mechanisms of public-sector reform in Nigeria from 1960 to 2026. Drawing on Institutional Theory, Public Choice Theory, New Public Management (NPM), and the Political Economy of Prebendalism, the paper synthesises secondary qualitative evidence from academic research, policy documents, institutional reports, legal developments, and empirical studies. The analysis reveals that Nigeria’s reform failures stem less from technical design flaws than from implementation deficits, isomorphic mimicry, political elite capture, and the abandonment of policies following electoral and executive transitions. Comparative assessments of Botswana, Rwanda, Singapore, and South Korea demonstrate that institutional resilience requires embedded bureaucratic autonomy, meritocratic career protections, and institutionalised leadership ecosystems. The study presents a strategic roadmap for strengthening public institutions against electoral fluctuations through statutory leadership protections, comprehensive digital and open-data systems, legislative codification of core reform instruments, and the effective implementation of local-government fiscal autonomy following the landmark Supreme Court judgment of 11 July 2024.