From alliance to adversary: regional parties and the challenges of federal crisis management during the COVID-19 pandemic

Abstract

This paper explores how political incentives shape the balance between decentralization and centralization in federal crisis policymaking. Building on second-generation fiscal federalism, it conceptualizes crisis responses as strategic choices rather than fixed institutional outcomes. In times of uncertainty, incumbents weigh political risks against collective benefits, producing either strategic decentralization, where regional leaders emphasize autonomy, or strategic centralization, where actors align across tiers to share political responsibility. The argument highlights the role of party systems as the primary mechanism linking institutional structure to behavior. Integrated party systems foster coordination and collective accountability, while truncated systems dominated by strong regional parties generate fragmented and inconsistent responses. Using the Protective Policy Index (PPI) to capture patterns of policy effort across federations, the analysis shows that political integration enhances coherence in crisis management. Empirical results further suggest that such coordination improves public health outcomes, demonstrating that political alignment strengthens not only governance but also the substantive effectiveness of policy responses.