The Name of a Person as a Subject of Humanitarian Knowledge: Between W. Windelband and W. Dilthey

Abstract

Introduction. The article is devoted to clarifying the epistemological status of the human name in the humanities. The theoretical basis of the research is the fundamental controversy between two philosophical traditions of the late 19th and early 20th centuries: Wilhelm Windelband's neo-Kantianism and Wilhelm Dilthey's philosophy of life. The article employs the method of comparative analysis and philosophical hermeneutics. It systematically compares two methodological paradigms: Windelband's idiographic approach and Dilthey's "science of the spirit." Against this background, the phenomenon of a person's name allows us to identify the possibilities and limitations of each concept. Content. The study substantiates the fact that, within the framework of W. Windelband's concept, a person's name appears on the border between a construct that places an individual in history and a mark of the "remainder of incomprehensibility" that eludes historical description. In W. Dilthey's approach, a name can serve as an element that integrates individual motives, actions, and cultural context into a cohesive semantic structure. At the same time, it highlights a key methodological challenge: the inherent limitations of reconstructing someone else's inner experience. Thus, a person's name not only serves as a tool for understanding, but also marks its semantic boundary, marking the distance between the researcher's consciousness and the person being studied. A comparative analysis reveals that the name occupies a hybrid position in both approaches, being both within and outside the structures of scientific knowledge. The article draws on the contemporary interpretation of J. E. Barash, which views the name as an element of the symbolic structure of the past and the subjective experience of the present. Conclusions. Based on the analysis conducted, it is concluded that a person's name is not just a subject of research, but a fundamental condition and guarantor of the possibility of understanding the "historical tension" between the past and the present. A person's name is a self-sufficient place where the issues of humanitarian knowledge crystallize. The final thesis of the article is that studying the phenomenon of a person's name solely within the framework of empirical history or "pure philosophy" is not effective, as it requires a comprehensive approach that takes into account its epistemological status at the intersection of individuality, subjectivity, and historical narration.