Skip to content

SUB-PLAY: Adversarial Policies against Partially Observed Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning Systems

Feb 2024 · Conference on Computer and Communications Security · 16 citations · 70 references
Computer Science

TL;DR

This study unveils the capability of attackers to generate adversarial policies even when restricted to partial observations of the victims in multi-agent competitive environments, and proposes a novel black-box attack (SUB-PLAY) that incorporates the concept of constructing multiple subgames to mitigate the impact of partial observability.

Abstract

Recent advancements in multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) have opened up vast application prospects, such as swarm control of drones, collaborative manipulation by robotic arms, and multi-target encirclement. However, potential security threats during the MARL deployment need more attention and thorough investigation. Recent research reveals that attackers can rapidly exploit the victim's vulnerabilities, generating adversarial policies that result in the failure of specific tasks. For instance, reducing the winning rate of a superhuman-level Go AI to around 20%. Existing studies predominantly focus on two-player competitive environments, assuming attackers possess complete global state observation. In this study, we unveil, for the first time, the capability of attackers to generate adversarial policies even when restricted to partial observations of the victims in multi-agent competitive environments. Specifically, we propose a novel black-box attack (SUB-PLAY) that incorporates the concept of constructing multiple subgames to mitigate the impact of partial observability and suggests sharing transitions among subpolicies to improve attackers' exploitative ability. Extensive evaluations demonstrate the effectiveness of SUB-PLAY under three typical partial observability limitations. Visualization results indicate that adversarial policies induce significantly different activations of the victims' policy networks. Furthermore, we evaluate three potential defenses aimed at exploring ways to mitigate security threats posed by adversarial policies, providing constructive recommendations for deploying MARL in competitive environments.

View source

Similar papers

2026

Action-Level Backdoor Attacks Against Deep Reinforcement Learning Systems via Adaptive Reward Exploration

Deep Reinforcement Learning (DRL) has demonstrated remarkable capabilities in domains such as robotics, finance, and autonomous systems. With the increasing cost of training, DRL models are increasingly shared and reused via model marketplaces, cloud platforms, and open-source repositories. This trend exposes DRL syste...

Ou-Bo Ma, L. Du, Yang Dai et al. · 0 citations
#machine learning Preprint Aug 2026

Trident : How to Break Deep Reinforcement Learning Cyber Defenses (Agentic)

Empirical evaluations reveal a fundamental brittleness in existing defenses: with a single trainable 7B planner, Trident reduces blue agent defensive performance by an average of 522% compared to static red agent baselines while autonomously discovering emergent behaviors such as decoy avoidance and adaptive state prio...

Ryozo Masukawa, Ian Bryant, Armita Kazeminajafabadi et al. · 1 citation
#machine learning Preprint Sep 2026

Fully Byzantine-Resilient Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning

It is proved that agents'parameters converge almost surely to the same limit points as in the attack-free case over time-varying communication graphs under linear parameterizations of the value and team-reward functions and Byzantine edge attacks.

Haejoon Lee, Dimitra Panagou · 0 citations
Open access Aug 2026

Dual-critic constrained deceptive Q-learning for deployment-time policy protection

The Dual-Critic Constrained Deceptive Q-Learning (DCD-Q) method is proposed, a deployment-time trajectory protection framework that aims to reduce the information leaked by released trajectories while preserving acceptable task performance.

Guang-Yu Pan, Bo Hou, Yao Chen et al. · 0 citations
Review Open access Aug 2026

Adversarial Machine Learning for Secure and Explainable AI Systems: A Comprehensive Review

A systematic analysis of 207 studies selected from 4447 records following the PRISMA 2020 guidelines, covering work published between 2020 and 2026 across cybersecurity and computer vision finds systems that are robust against adaptive adversaries, interpretable under operational constraints, and auditable in environme...

Hajar Ouazza, Fadoua Khennou, Abderrahim Abdellaoui · 0 citations

Related blog posts

MIT News · Artificial Intelligence Sep 29, 2026

Who we become when we talk to machines

Professor Sherry Turkle’s new book, “Artificial Intimacy,” offers a withering critique of chatbots and the antisocial dynamics she believes they encourage.

We use cookies to run the site and, with your consent, for analytics and to show ads. See our Cookie Policy.