THE URBANISM OF EXCEPTION : Scalar Rivalry and Political Loyalty in the Making of the Panorama Tbilisi Megaproject

Abstract

In flawed democracies, such as the Republic of Georgia, legal exceptions for urban megaprojects are becoming a standard mode of governance. While frequently analyzed as singular, top‐down sovereign acts, I argue that the imposition of such exceptions is a complex and dispersed process. Drawing on the case of the Panorama Tbilisi megaproject introduced in 2014 in Tbilisi, Georgia, this article reconceptualizes the urbanism of exception as a governance strategy engineered through intergovernmental rivalry and institutionalized political loyalty. Through a qualitative analysis, I show how rivalry between national and local governments controlled by opposing political parties led to the strategic rewriting of national law to bypass local opposition. Furthermore, I demonstrate how political loyalty functions as a governance tool, blurring public‐private boundaries and ultimately culminating in the promotion of project executives to high‐level state positions. The article contributes to critical urban theory by revealing the contested nature of state power in megaproject implementation and proposes the concept of the commodification of exception: the centralization of the right to bypass rules as a tradable asset available exclusively to political and economic elites.