Science-Push and Market-Pull in Hydrogen Technology Collaborative Innovation System: A Tripartite Evolutionary Game Analysis

Abstract

Hydrogen innovation requires coordination across scientific research, engineering development, infrastructure deployment, market application, and public governance. However, heterogeneous incentives can destabilize collaborative participation even under strong policy support. This study examines how science-push and market-pull shape collaborative innovation in hydrogen technology. We develop a tripartite evolutionary game involving enterprises, universities, research institutions, and government under bounded rationality. The model incorporates collaborative returns and proportional downside-risk allocation, participation costs, spillover-based outside payoffs, market demand sensitivity, technological-foresight capability, and government governance strategies. The analytical results and numerical scenario illustrations identify three equilibrium configurations: independent R&D, one-sided participation, and full bilateral participation. Their occurrence depends on collaborative returns, participation costs, downside-risk penalties, external driving intensity, and governance conditions. Under matched driving intensity, the relative effectiveness of science-push and market-pull is actor-specific and determined by the balance among collaborative returns, costs, and outside opportunities. These findings clarify the strategic conditions shaping participation in hydrogen innovation systems and provide scenario-contingent implications for benefit allocation, risk management, and collaborative governance.