The Overstated Cost of AI Fairness in Criminal Justice

Abstract

A dominant critique of algorithmic fairness holds that increasing fairness reduces predictive accuracy, imposing a cost on society. We challenge that assumption by empirically analyzing the COMPAS dataset. We make two contributions. First, using causal inference methods, we show that racial bias is not only present in the COMPAS dataset but is also amplified by the models trained on it. Widely used models do more than replicate existing bias; they exacerbate it. This undercuts both the assumption that algorithmic decision-making offers a neutral improvement over human judgment and the weaker claim that it merely mirrors preexisting human bias. Second, we reframe the fairness-accuracy tradeoff. Applying fairness constraints does not necessarily cost predictive accuracy in criminal justice. Prediction systems operationalize concepts such as risk through implicit and often flawed normative choices about what to predict and how. The tradeoff claim assumes that the unconstrained model's prediction is an optimal baseline. Fairness constraints can instead correct distortions introduced by biased outcome variables: rearrest data, in this case, captures and magnifies systemic racial disparities. Under some interventions, therefore, fairness carries none of the cost presumed in policy debates. These dynamics extend beyond criminal justice to lending, hiring, and housing, where biased outcome variables reinforce inequality independently of proxy selection. We draw out what this implies for how law and policy should approach fairness adjustments in criminal law.