RATTL targets runtime safety for agents, including LLM-based systems, acting under uncertainty, and proves a Safety Sandwich: the RATTL value lies between the uninformed robust value and the full- knowledge optimum, with a gap that vanishes as the posterior concentrates.
Abstract
How cautious should an agent be while it is still learning its environment? We propose RATTL (Risk-Adversarial Total-Reward Learning), which ties caution to epistemic uncertainty: the agent holds a Bayesian posterior over unknown dynamics and plans against a Wasserstein ambiguity set whose radius is a monotone function of that posterior. The radius contracts with evidence, so behaviour interpolates continuously between worst-case robustness and risk-neutral total-reward maximization. The design follows the duality underlying the Entropic Value-at-Risk, which converts the choice of a risk level into the choice of an ambiguity radius. We show the resulting planning problem is well posed under transience and compactness conditions, and prove a Safety Sandwich: the RATTL value lies between the uninformed robust value and the full- knowledge optimum, with a gap that vanishes as the posterior concentrates. In a canonical binary-hazard instance, the induced criterion reduces to Conditional Value-at-Risk at a level set by the posterior entropy. A worked example shows the agent deferring the efficient action until a sharp identification threshold. RATTL targets runtime safety for agents, including LLM-based systems, acting under uncertainty.
An agent still learning its environment should be cautious while ignorant and bold once confident. The entropic value-at-risk captures this through a robust-optimization identity---a confidence level fixes the radius of a relative-entropy ball of alternative models---but that ball cannot reach catastrophes the nominal...
Abstract.
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Unknown authors· SIAM Journal on Optimization· 4 citations· ⚡1
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