It is argued that relational priors should not be a default add-on for LLM-MAS and their safer use is diagnostic and task-specific: compare against a no-prior baseline, monitor correctness-conditioned metrics when truth matters, and omit the relational layer when validation does not justify it.
Abstract
Large language model-based multi-agent systems (LLM-MAS) are designed through roles, debate protocols, and aggregation rules. These choices create implicit social expectations: agents may be expected to trust, challenge, defer to, or collaborate with peers. We study the effects of making inter-agent relation semantics explicit. We use a minimal signed-network formulation of relational priors and inject natural-language renderings into agent system prompts while holding the task protocol fixed. Across a commons-governance simulation and multi-agent debate, relational priors primarily act as convergence pressure: increasing relational positivity tends to make agents coordinate or agree more readily. This pressure can help when utility rewards behavioral alignment, as in sustainable resource governance and subjective consensus. It does not, however, reliably improve accuracy. In objective QA debates, higher positivity can increase agreement even when correctness-conditioned agreement does not improve and may decline in some settings. Effects vary by model backbone, relation type, and topology; explicit neutrality is not equivalent to omitting relational framing. We argue that relational priors should not be a default add-on for LLM-MAS. Their safer use is diagnostic and task-specific: compare against a no-prior baseline, monitor correctness-conditioned metrics when truth matters, and omit the relational layer when validation does not justify it.
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Large language models are increasingly deployed as interacting agents, making the persistence of their action policies across repeated interaction critical for reliable multi-agent operation. We investigate whether and how agent-generated, non-binding pre-play communication ("cheap talk") increases such persistence in...
GovSim-SelfGovern is introduced, an extension of the GovSim common-pool resource environment in which agents author executable Python governance rules, receive sandbox validation feedback, vote on proposed laws, and live under the rules they enact across rounds.
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