Agent-based models of markets readily produce emergent instabilities, but telling a genuine collective effect apart from a parameter artefact takes discipline. We apply Bouchaud's phase-diagram method to a continuous-double-auction order-book model. The method is to map the full phase diagram, test its robustness to rule changes, and rule out degenerate and numerical origins before we call any feature a tipping point. The model has fundamental-anchored zero-intelligence liquidity and a mid-anchored chartist herding layer, controlled by the fraction $\varphi$ and the strength $\kappa$ of herders. A 7x6 grid (336 runs, each with a scrambled-sign null) locates an emergent liquidity-stress crossover. The order parameter, the fraction of events with a one-sided book, rises to about 0.34 at $(\varphi,\kappa)=(0.9,1.0)$, is zero across all 42 scrambled cells, and forms a smooth crossover rather than a discontinuous Dark Corner. The dry-up is rule-robust (it recurs under an order-flow-imbalance rule), horizon-robust (about 0.32-0.35 across a 16x range of momentum window), and has a monotone onset boundary $\varphi^*(\kappa) = \{0.55, 0.45, 0.36\}$. We then decompose the mechanism at a matched directional-bias amplitude (mean |p_buy - 0.5| about 0.269). Price-momentum herding carries a large, comparator-robust reflexive component (+0.29; buying begets buying), whereas the order-flow rule's component is about 0 and comparator-dependent. The RMS-mispricing gradient is a placement artefact, largest at $\kappa=0$. A companion two-market analysis finds no directional cross-market contagion across a signal-only herding link.
Fundamental-value anchoring of resting liquidity is a causal stabiliser of an order-book market: while the anchor holds, even a heavily leveraged book stays quiet. We take that anchor strength as a continuous control and characterise the endogenous liquidity crises that appear once it is nearly removed. In a single con...
Prediction-market shares differ from traditional financial products in that, with no information or outside utility, classical delta-neutral Central Limit Order Book~(CLOB) market making cannot be financed by payoff-uninformative noise flow. Transaction-level evidence from a major prediction-market CLOB platform shows...
Cheng-Qi Zang, Gabriel P.Andrade, Tomoyuki Nakajima· 0 citations
At the scale of seconds the observed mid carries a stationary, mean-reverting error around a latent efficient price. We build an order book whose own flow produces that error and solve for the trading rule that maximises the long-run average profit rate net of the bid-ask spread. In a liquid large-tick asset the spread...
Financial institutions meet withdrawals by selling overlapping portfolios, so creditor runs and market prices are jointly determined. I derive an exact asset-market representation. A local architecture rank bounds propagation dimensions for queries that factor through bank-cushion shocks and withdrawal outcomes. One-mo...
Gerrit Meyerheim· CESifo working papers· 0 citations
Market efficiency relies fundamentally on stable liquidity. Consequently, forecasting liquidity dynamics is a priority for both investors and regulators. We introduce a new tail-risk metric, Illiquidity-at-Risk (IlliQaR), designed to quantify the magnitude of extreme liquidity dry-ups. Relying upon the realized Amihud...
Demetrio Lacava, Paolo Santucci de Magistris· 0 citations
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