Institutionalizing liquid democracy: Scope, limits and application of the liquid assembly model
Abstract
The paper examines whether liquid democracy can be institutionalized through the model of a liquid assembly as a complementary institution within representative democracy. The analysis starts from the crisis of legitimacy of the electoral-party model and Fishkin’s trilemma of democratic reform, which shows the difficulty of combining mass participation, political equality and deliberative quality. The paper relies on theoretical-normative analysis and a critical review of democratic theory, platform studies and computer-science literature. It argues that a liquid assembly can strengthen selective participation, flexible representation and the epistemic quality of public decisions, but only if it is designed as a socio-technical institution with clear legal, algorithmic and security safeguards. The main risks are concentration of voting power, algorithmic opacity, polarization, disinformation, misuse of political data and tension between verifiability and secrecy of the vote. The paper concludes that the liquid assembly should not replace parliament. Its realistic institutional role is that of a supplementary, thematically limited or advisory-suspensive body in areas of public policy where expertise and democratic legitimacy need to be connected.