Security analysis on post-quantum secure authenticated key agreement protocol for wireless sensor networks
TL;DR
A quantum-resistant authentication protocol for WSN using the RLWE algorithm is proposed that exhibits severe security weaknesses including offline password guessing attack, user impersonation attack, privileged insider attack, KSSTI attack, sensor node impersonation attack, and replay attack, and corresponding countermeasures are put forward.
Abstract
Wireless sensor networks (WSN) serve as fundamental components for data collection and environment-aware perception in the Internet of Things (IoT), and have been widely applied in military, healthcare, and various other domains. Authentication protocols are indispensable to guarantee that only authorized users can access the data generated by remote sensor nodes. Cryptanalysis of existing authentication protocols plays a vital role in discovering security flaws and developing highly secure authentication schemes. At present, the security of most WSN authentication protocols primarily depends on traditional public key cryptosystems including elliptic curve cryptography (ECC), RSA, and bilinear pairings. The security strength of these classical cryptosystems is grounded in the computational intractability of mathematical problems such as large integer factorization and discrete logarithms, which have been proved to be efficiently solvable by quantum computers. To mitigate this critical vulnerability, Singh et al. proposed a quantum-resistant authentication protocol for WSN using the RLWE algorithm. However, our thorough security analysis reveals that, despite presenting a security proof in the random oracle model and informal security analysis, their scheme not only has a design flaw due to misuse of the reconciliation function, but also exhibits severe security weaknesses including offline password guessing attack, user impersonation attack, privileged insider attack, KSSTI attack, sensor node impersonation attack, and replay attack. To overcome these drawbacks, we also put forward corresponding countermeasures in this paper. Our countermeasures effectively resist offline guessing, insider, impersonation, replay, and KSSTI attacks, while preserving quantum resistance.