ECON tribute Discussion

Signaling via Money

We study mechanisms in which agents'preferences depend both on an object allocation and on a third party's beliefs about private information. A mechanism determines an allocation, transfers, and sends signals to the aftermarket. We compare two informational environments: (i) private transfers, where the aftermarket obs...

Two-Sided Plausibility Constraints in Persuasion

A sender with commitment provides additional information to an already informed receiver. Final posterior means must be more dispersed than initial means and less dispersed than the state, in convex order. We characterize when these two plausibility constraints are also sufficient, so that every distribution satisfying...

Department of Economics

Contracting for Decision-Relevant Beliefs

An expert may misreport her forecast to influence a decision she cares about. We study contracts that elicit both her belief about a verifiable state and her stake in a binary action. If every belief is possible at two distinct stakes, exact incentive compatibility prevents a belief-only mechanism from letting the acti...

Bonn Econ Discussion Papers

Pandering to the Future