Skip to content
Preprint

Robustness or Crowding: Experimental Design for Trading Strategy Capacity

Aug 2026 · 0 citations · 48 references
Economics

Abstract

How much capital a trading strategy can absorb before its edge disappears is a causal question about how much is deployed, but it is answered with observational proxies that rest on incompatible assumptions. We ask what experiment would answer it instead, and show that two features of the problem interact to constrain any answer. Deployed capital erodes the edge gradually, so a trial of fixed length measures less than the eventual effect; and parallel implementations of one strategy trade the same securities, so they are not independent units. Comparing implementations on the same date removes market-wide shocks, which is what makes the comparison credible. But the crowding created by the strategy's own accumulated position is common to those implementations too, and an arbitrary date effect absorbs it exactly: the comparison that makes the experiment robust is the one that prevents it from measuring the crowding capacity is about. A same-date design recovers one implementation's private response at the prevailing level of aggregate positioning, and reaching the aggregate effect requires either implementations with deliberately different exposure to that position or variation in it over time. We characterise what each route identifies and what it costs, establish how far a fixed holding period understates the eventual effect and how to correct for it, and show what a finite set of deployment levels can and cannot reveal. A calibration on a purpose-built panel illustrates the resulting design rules and prices a study that would follow them.

View source

Similar papers

Jul 2026

Collusion with Competitive Marginals: Price-Level Audits Are Blind by Construction

Empirical work on algorithmic collusion asks one question of the data: are prices supracompetitive? We show this can be answered"no"by a conspiracy that is nonetheless profitable. Consider bidding agents that couple only through the joint distribution of their unexplained bid components, leaving every agent's own bid l...

Xin Xu, Cheng-Rui Wu, Jiayu Lu et al. · 1 citation
Preprint Aug 2026

REFLEX: Reflexive Equilibrium Fixed-point Learning for Endogenous eXchanges

REFLEX combines three measurable features of dealer behavior into a single retraining modulus, a pre-deployment stability margin estimated from a desk's own quote and execution history that predicts whether repeated retraining will converge or amplify itself, which turns an abstract convergence theorem into a market-le...

V. Nagarajan, Shriraghav Ashok · 0 citations
Preprint Aug 2026

Trading Scope for Credibility in Difference-in-Differences

When parallel trends fails for some treated cohorts but not others, the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT), an average over all of them, is exactly the target that becomes hard to recover. We propose changing the estimand rather than defending it. The credible-subpopulation local ATT (LATT) is the effect for...

Parush Arora, Abhishek Chand · 0 citations
#machine learning Preprint Aug 2026

The Axiomatic Trader: Latent Regularity, Information Budgets, and the Canonical Form of a Quantitative Investment System

Systematic trading rests on one article of faith: that regularities found in the past persist. This paper does three things. First, it states that faith as five axioms, each a commonplace practitioners already accept: (A1) a decision may use only what was known when it was made; (A2) what looks like the market changing...

Jiayu Li · 0 citations
Open access Aug 2026

Regulating the Unseen: Dark Liquidity, Algorithmic Trading, and the Limits of SEBI's Disclosure Regime

Indian securities law does not recognise the dark pool as a category of trading venue: pre-trade transparency is mandated on every recognised exchange, and off-exchange crossing networks of the kind permitted under United States Regulation ATS or the European Union's MiFID II framework have no domestic equivalent. This...

Daksh Gulhane · 0 citations
Open access Jul 2026

Loss Aversion as Optimal Attention Allocation: Mismatches Are the Squeaky Wheel

We study an agent who tracks several independent, unobserved, slowly drifting states and is paid by how well a chosen action matches each state but who can process only a bounded amount of information per period. The payoff environment is deliberately symmetric—quadratic matching losses, Gaussian drift, Gaussian observ...

Julian C. Jamison · 0 citations

We use cookies to run the site and, with your consent, for analytics and to show ads. See our Cookie Policy.