A NON-COOPERATIVE SHAPLEY VALUE REPRESENTATION OF LUCE CONTESTS SUCCESS FUNCTIONS

REVISITING SHAPLEY AND SHUBIK (1971) VIA NASH (1953): A REFINEMENT OF THE CORE IN THE ASSIGNMENT GAME

On a competition problem under uncertainty and risks

A hierarchical model of the problem of competition between two firms under the influence of uncertain factors is considered. Two companies produce and supply the same type of products to the market. In addition, products of the same type produced by the importing company enter the market. Moreover, only possible limits...

Working Paper Series

Fair and Efficient Balanced Allocation for Indivisible Goods

A metric on solutions of the bargaining problem

We consider the classic bargaining problem: two players have to agree on a `fair'division $(x,y) \in \Omega \subset \mathbb{R}_{\geq 0}^2$ which results in Player 1 receiving $x$ and Player 2 receiving $y$. The usual approach to this problem has been to impose a number of desirable axioms that a fair division should ha...

Equilibrium in a Failed Cartel: Set-Valued Reactions and Sources of Market Asymmetry

We study a three-firm market following the breakdown of an initially complete cartel, taking both the breakdown and the identity of the departing firm as exogenously given. In the baseline model, the former cartel members no longer coordinate: all three firms choose quantities simultaneously and non-cooperatively. Thus...