Populism, reform, and failure: Constrained constitutional ambition in Italy

Abstract

This article examines the trajectory of constitutional reform under the Meloni government (2022–2026) as a case of failed institutional transformation. While much of the literature on populism in power has focused on successful cases of democratic erosion, the Italian case shows how ambitious reform projects can be progressively scaled back and ultimately defeated. The article conceptualises this dynamic as constrained constitutional ambition, a process in which populist actors seek to reshape the polity dimension but are limited by dense institutional, political, and procedural conditions. Drawing on the concepts of populist domestication and democratic resilience, the analysis highlights how reform initiatives are filtered through parliamentary procedures, coalition dynamics, and referendum politics. Particular attention is devoted to the 2026 constitutional referendum, which rejected judicial reform and illustrates the interaction between institutional limits, political polarisation, and voter behaviour. The article contributes to comparative debates by showing that reform failure is analytically as important as institutional entrenchment for understanding populism in power. It argues that democratic resilience operates not through the absence of conflict, but through the capacity of institutions to structure and contain it.