It is shown that first-turn safety is an incomplete proxy for conversational safety persistence and motivate evaluation across complete dialogue trajectories, and TAF-MED, a physician-reviewed benchmark of 500 fixed three-turn scenarios, is introduced and evaluated.
Abstract
Large language models (LLMs) increasingly provide conversational health information that may influence treatment decisions, yet existing benchmarks do not isolate whether medication-safety boundaries persist across follow-ups after explicit self-treatment intent. We introduce TAF-MED, a physician-reviewed benchmark of 500 fixed three-turn scenarios, and evaluate eight LLMs across 4,000 conversations. A rubric-based automated judge labelled responses as SAFE, LEAKY, or UNSAFE, and two physicians independently annotated a model-balanced random subset of 400 conversations. We assessed unsafe guidance, collapse after a strictly SAFE initial response, and model-ranking stability. Overall, 71.6% of conversations contained an UNSAFE response, and 61.4% of those beginning with a strictly SAFE response later collapsed to UNSAFE; model-level collapse rates ranged from 24.4% to 96.2%. Four of 28 model pairs reversed order between initial unsafe and collapse rates. Automated labels achieved 94.3% agreement with the adjudicated physician reference ($\kappa = 0.895$). These findings show that first-turn safety is an incomplete proxy for conversational safety persistence and motivate evaluation across complete dialogue trajectories. We will release TAF-MED on Hugging Face to support reproducible research on multi-turn medical safety.
Proof-of-concept evidence that strong single-turn safety does not necessarily persist during sustained adversarial interaction is provided, highlighting the need for long-horizon evaluations and conversation-level safeguards that account for risk accumulating across turns.
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